AN EXAMINATION ON REGULATING THE
EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN SKILLED WORKERS
IN THE UNITED STATES

Yan Chent
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore.'
Emma Lazarus' famous poem about the Statue of Liberty inspired
generations of immigrants who came to America seeking a better life.
However, once immigrant workers experienced the cold and complex
system of employment immigration in the United States, they realized that
the country's tone was not necessarily as warm and welcoming as the poem
suggested. Beyond the world of foreign immigrant workers, the U.S.
system of employment immigration is often neglected. As a result, our
assessment of the implication of immigration law on the workplace rights
of foreign workers is often obscured.
This comment attempts to shed light on the current regulatory scheme
governing the employment of foreign workers in the United States. This
regulatory scheme primarily involves the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (the Act) and the regulations promulgated thereunder. In addition, this
comment will focus on the status of skilled workers who, unlike unskilled
alien workers or those in the agriculture industry, have been largely absent
from public attention. Finally, this comment attempts to identify the most
serious problems with the employment immigration system, explain its
adverse impact on the individual rights of foreign workers in the
workplace, point out its friction with the policies intended to be furthered
by labor and employment laws, suggest courses of action to correct the
existing problems, and promote ideas for perfecting the system.
Part I of this comment provides an overview of the H-1B temporary
admission visa program that is used by most foreign skilled workers in the
United States. Part I also focuses on the employment-based permanent
t J.D. 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. Emma Lazarus, New Colossus, in FAVORITE POEMS OLD AND NEW 488 (Helen
Ferris ed. 1957).
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immigration program, which most foreign workers are subject to if they
seek to stay permanently in the U.S.
Subpart A explains the criteria and application process for obtaining
an H-lB visa. Subpart A also identifies the major limitations that the H-lB
program imposes on the status of foreign workers and summarizes the
newest amendments to the program enacted by Congress. Subpart B
outlines the employment-based. permanent immigration mechanism. In
addition to explaining the basic features of immigration preferences and the
quota system, this section summarizes the labor certification process that
constitutes the most significant step for foreign skilled workers seeking
permanent residence.
Part II of this comment focuses on analyzing the defects of the current
system. Subpart A identifies such problems as the system's irrational
departure from market reality, the inherent tension between temporary and
permanent admission programs, and the unwarranted restrictions on the
Subpart B evaluates and
workplace rights of foreign employees.
summarizes various proposals for reforming the existing framework. Also,
Subpart B argues for adopting either a human capital-oriented permanent
employment immigration system or a market-driven temporary
employment program. Subpart B also argues for adopting measures to
empower foreign skilled workers and to eliminate the legal obstacles that
unnecessarily burden their bargaining positions in workplaces.
I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR EMPLOYMENT
OF FOREIGN SKILLED WORKERS: AN OVERVIEW

A.

Temporary Admission of ForeignSkilled Workers:
Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B)

Temporary migrant workers are individuals whom the United States
conditionally admits for limited periods of time for the purpose of carrying
out specific tasks. The H-1B visa program is the basic immigration and
legal vehicle through which the temporary employment of foreign skilled
workers is regulated. Under this program, a potential U.S. employer of an
eligible foreign worker must file an H-1B visa petition with the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).2 In order to be eligible for
the H-lB category, a foreign worker must come to the United States to

2. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (2000). See also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1) (2000) (explaining that
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, INS functions have been transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security, and its immigration service functions will be placed into
the new Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services).
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The term "specialty
perform services in a specialty occupation.3
occupation" is defined as "an occupation that requires theoretical and
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and
attainment of a bachelor's [degree] or higher degree in the specific
specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the U.S. ' A This
requirement makes the H-lB visa program available only to those foreign
workers who have received a bachelor's degree in a specialty that is related
to the job position for which they are applying. Furthermore, the job
position must require a bachelor's degree as the minimum qualification for
prospective candidates of the H-lB visa program.
The H-lB petition procedure consists of three phases. In the first
phase, as in many other employment contexts, a foreign worker is offered a
job from a U.S. employer. At this time, an employment contract can be
formulated. However, the substantive terms of the contract, such as the
compensation and the terms of employment, are subject to qualifications
imposed by immigration law.
Next, the employer who extends an offer to the foreign worker must
file a Labor Condition Application (LCA) with the Department of Labor
(DOL). The LCA must contain certain attestations such as: (1) the
employer will pay the H-iB workers the prevailing wage level for the
occupation in the area of intended employment, (2) the employer will offer
the same benefits package on the same basis to similarly employed U.S.
workers and H-lB workers, and (3) the employment of H-lB workers will
not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed
in the area of intended employment. 5 At the time the LCA is filed, the
employer must inform the existing employees that an LCA is being filed on
behalf of a prospective alien worker.6
Finally, after the DOL certifies the LCA, the employer files a
nonimmigrant employment status petition with the INS. It is through this
petition that the employer must establish that the alien will be employed in
a qualifying specialty occupation and that the alien has the necessary
qualifications for the position.7 The INS must approve the petition before
the H- lB alien worker begins performing services.8 On average, a typical
H-1B petition will take three to five months to complete. 9
3. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (1994).
4. § 1184(i); § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1) (2000); 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.731, 655.732 (2000).
6. § 655.734.
7. § 1184(c).
8. Id.; § 214.2 (h)(i).
9. See Law Offices of Carl Shusterman, INS Service Centers Processing Times,
available at http://www.shusterman.com/toc-sc.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2003) (estimating
that the INS has been taking longer than five months to approve each H-IB case since
9/11/01).
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Restrictions on the H-1B program circumscribe the legal status of
foreign skilled workers in the domestic workplace. First, the foreign
workers are only allowed to work for U.S. employers "temporarily."
Initially, the H-1B petition may only be approved for a maximum threeyear period.' ° Extensions may be obtained up to an additional three years
for a total maximum period of six years." Generally speaking, without
applying for permanent resident status within this six-year period, a foreign
worker must depart the United States upon expiration of the authorized
time period.
Second, the Immigration Act
• • 12imposes an annual limit on the H-1B
petitions--65,000 new admissions.
An H-1B number must be available
at the time a new petition is adjudicated. The INS will not approve an HlB petition once the cap has been reached during a fiscal year."
Third, the H-1B visa is job specific, as opposed to worker specific.
Thus, an H-lB foreign worker is required to file a new H-lB petition if the
worker changes to a job position offered by another U.S. employer. 14 Such
a change-of-job application involves exactly the same procedures as the
initial one; the new job offer must satisfy the same "specialty occupation"
and "prevailing wages" requirements. Furthermore, even if a foreign
worker is promoted to a different position with the same employer, the
worker is still obligated to go through the petition process and obtain a new
approval from the DOL and the INS.' 5
Congress passed two statutes in the late 1990s that substantially
amended the H-1B program of the Immigration Act. These legislative
actions largely responded to the claimed shortage of information
technology workers at the height of the Internet boom.' 6 In the American
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA),
Congress increased the number of available H-1B visas from 65,000 per
year to 115,000 per year in 1999 and 2000, and then to 107,500 in 2001.7

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

§ 214.2(h).
Id.
§ 1184(g)(1)(A).
Id.
§ 214.2(h)(2).
Id.

16.

AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION HANDBOOK § 12.2

(2001). See also Jung S. Hahm, Note, American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act of 1998: Balancing Economic and Labor Interests under the New H-1B
Visa Program,85 CORNELL L. REv. 1673, 1682-86 (2000) (discussing the legislative history
of the ACWIA).
17. American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (g)(1)(A)(i-iv) (Supp. IV
1998)). Congress amended this Act in 2000 to increase the total amount of available visas
for the fiscal year 2001 from 107,500 to 195,000. American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (codified as
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As a trade-off, Congress imposed additional worker protection
requirements on "H-1B dependent" employers, which target those
employers most likely to unfairly exploit the program. 8 Congress also
enhanced the DOL's authority on investigating the abusive use of the
program. 9 In the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century
Act of 2000 (AC21), Congress once again increased the H-lB cap to
195,000 for fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003.20 The cap will revert to
65,000 in fiscal year 2004, absent further congressional increases.2'
Moreover, AC21 improved the portability of H-iB visas so that a worker
may begin new employment immediately upon the filing of a change-ofjob petition by a new employer and need not wait months for the actual
approval by the INS. 22 This obviously facilitates job transfers to foreign
workers.
Foreign skilled workers have very few legal alternatives to H-l B visas
for pursuing temporary employment in the United States. A few other visa
programs afford work authorization, often to very specific types of foreign
workers. The "E" visa is available for investors and traders who enter via a
bilateral treaty arrangement; the "F' and "J" visas are for foreign students
and exchanged scholars who may accept study-related employments for a
very short period of time for practical training purposes; the "L" visa is for
intra-company transfers of executives and managers; and the "TN" visa is
for professionals who enter under the North American Free Trade
23
3 Due to their limited applicability, these visa programs are not
Agreement.
to the majority of foreign skilled workers.
widely available
B.

PermanentAdmission of ForeignSkilled Workers

"There is nothing as permanent as a temporary worker."2 4 Estimates
indicate that at least half and possibly as many as two-thirds of H-1B
workers intend to stay in the United States permanently.2 5 This shows that
most H-1B workers use the temporary employment visas as bridges leading
to permanent residency, a status that permits permanent work in the United
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(iv) (2000)).
18. See 8 U.S.C. § I182(n)(l)(E-G), (n)(3) (2000).
19. § 1182(n)(2)(G).
20. § 1l84(g)(1)(A)(iv-vi).
21. § 1182(g)(1)(A)(vii).
22. § 1184(m).
23. See generally AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS
§§ 2:73, 2:23, 2:68, 2:29, 2:76 (2001) (discussing E, F, J, L, and TN visas, respectively).
24. B. Lindsay Lowell & Susan Martin, Transatlantic Round Table on High Skilled
Migration:A Report on the Proceedings:Brussels, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 649, 657 (2001).
25. B. Lindsay Lowell, H-1B Temporary Workers: Estimating the Population 15
(2000), availableat http://www.ieeeusa.org/forum/issues/hlbvisa/hlbreport.pdf (last visited
Oct. 27, 2003).
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States. Under the Immigration Act, employment-based immigration is
separately regulated, applying a scheme virtually unrelated to the
temporary admission of foreign workers.26 Such a scheme also determines
to some extent the legal status of foreign skilled workers in the domestic
workplaces. This section outlines the basic legal vehicle through which the
permanent admission of foreign skilled workers is implemented.
1.

The Framework for Employment-Based Permanent
Immigration: Priority System and Numerical Limitations

The Immigration Act sets forth three basic preference categories of
immigrant visas-"green cards," for example-that are issued based on
aliens undertaking employment in the United States.2 ' The first preference
is for priority workers of extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts,
education, business, or athletics. 28 The law imposes the fewest restrictions
on the admission of aliens in this category, which includes Nobel Prize
winners and Olympic gold medalists. 29 Most foreign skilled workers,
however, fall into the second and the third preferences, which both require
a specific job offer and a lengthy process of labor certification
application. 30 The second preference is for aliens with exceptional ability
in the sciences, arts, or business, and advanced-degree professionals.3 The
third preference is for skilled workers or professionals without advanced
degrees.32
Except for priority workers who fall into the first preference, a foreign
worker typically has three hurdles to overcome. First, a green card sponsor
such as an employer must obtain a statement from the DOL certifying that
qualified U.S. workers are unavailable to fill the offered position and that
the foreign worker's employment will not adversely affect the wages or
working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.3 3 Upon receiving
the DOL certification, the employer applies to the INS for immigrant visa
approval.34 Finally, if the INS approves this petition and the foreign
worker is already present in the country, as most H-lBs are, she then
AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS § 4:1 (2001).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (1994). The fourth and fifth preference categories (applying to
religious workers and millionaire investors) are rarely used and are therefore omitted from
the discussion here.
28. § 1153(b)(1).
29. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h) (2000), with § 204.5(k), and § 204.5(1).
30. § 1153(b)(2), (3).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) (2000).
34. § I 153(b)(2)(B) (providing a waiver to the job offer, therefore the labor certification
requirement but this exception is only applicable to aliens whose admission is in the national
interest and to certain physicians).
26.
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applies to the INS for adjustment to permanent resident status when the
immigrant visa number becomes available.35
Even if a foreign worker passes the first two obstacles, she may not be
able to adjust her status to that of permanent worker right away because an
immigrant visa may not be available. The immigrant visa numbers are
subject to a statutory numerical cap.3 6 The Immigration Act provides
140,000 annual immigrant visas for employment-based immigrants, each of
the three preference categories having 40,040 per year plus any number not
required by the higher-ranked preferences.3 7 The Immigration Act also
provides that no more than 7% of employment-based immigrants may
come from a single country."
This means that no more than 9,800
immigrants per year, including their immediate family members, can arrive
from any given country, regardless of that foreign country's size or
population.
The entire application process may be time consuming. According to
current estimates, a labor certification application takes from 12 to 36
months to process, 39 an immigrant visa petition 3 to 10 months, 40 and an
adjustment of status application 15 to 24 months, depending on the
availability of immigrant visa numbers.4 The lengthy process for green
card applications creates a serious problem for foreign skilled workers.
Most of these workers are holding H-IB visas which are subject to the sixyear limit. Because of the processing delay, only 61,000 out of 140,000
permanent employment slots are being used each year. 42 At the same time,

35. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(2) (2000).
37. § 1151(d).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a), (e) (2000).
39. These data vary from state to state. See Department of Labor, Foreign Labor
Certification Processing Times and Dates, availableat http://www.ows.doleta.gov/foreign
/times.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
40. Law Offices of Carl Shusterman, INS Service Centers Processing Times, available
at http://www.shusterman.com/toc-sc.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). An immigrant visa
petition is designated as a Form 1-140 application. Id.
41. Id. An adjustment of status petition is designated as an 1-485 application. Ms.
Jenny Yan pointed out in our interview that many applicants from populous China and India
who filed adjustment of status applications in 1997 waited for nearly 30 to 36 months to
receive INS approvals, largely because the per-country quota limited the availability of
immigrant visa numbers for those two countries during that period. Id.; see also Interview
with Ms. Jenny Yan, immigration lawyer, Judith G. Cooper, P.C., Houston, Tex. (Oct. 25,
2002).
42. See B. Lindsay Lowell, H-lB Temporary Workers: Estimating the Population
(2000), available at http://www.ieeeusa.org/forum/issues/hlbvisa/hlbreport.pdf (last visited
on Oct. 27, 2003). For the five-year period ending in 1996, 307,670 out of 700,000
employment-based permanent resident statuses were granted, with approximately 61,534
each year. It was estimated that, at an annual admission rate of 61,701, no significant
increase would occur from 2003 going forward.
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although many H-1Bs would want to permanently immigrate, the long
waiting period in excess of the duration of the stay permitted on the H-lB
visa makes it impossible for them to do so.' 3 Congress responded to this
concern with AC21 by allowing certain qualified H-1B workers to extend
their statuses past the six-year limit if their permanent residency petitions
are delayed. 44 Further, Congress eliminated the per-country ceilings to
allow unused employment-based immigrant visas to be made available to
the nationals of oversubscribed countries.4 5
2.

The Prerequisite to Permanent Admission of Foreign Skilled
Workers: Labor Certification Procedure

The most critical part of the permanent admission process is the labor
The application includes a set of detailed
certification application.
measures to protect the domestic workforce. As a result, this part
constitutes the most difficult legal hurdle for foreign workers to overcome.
An individual labor certification from the Department of Labor is
required for employers wishing to employ a foreign worker on a permanent
basis. 46 The DOL must certify to the INS that there are no qualified U.S.
workers available and willing to accept the job at the prevailing wage.47 In
reviewing the applications, the DOL applies the following qualifying
criteria: (1) there must be a bona fide job opening; (2) job requirements
must adhere to occupational customs and may not be unduly restrictive nor
tailored to the foreign worker's specific qualifications; and (3) the
48
employer must pay at least the prevailing wage.
The DOL utilizes two mechanisms in determining whether these
standards are met. In a regular processing method, the employer is
required to conduct an active recruitment campaign for the job openings for
which foreign workers are sought, under the close supervision of the State
Workforce Agencies (SWA) .4 The SWA will work with the employer to
develop a job advertisement.5 ° The employer must interview all candidates
43. Id. at 16 (estimating that no more than 20% of the H-lB workers admitted between
1996 to 1998 would adjust to permanent status within their six-year duration of stay because
of the record average waiting time).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4) (2000).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1 152(a)(5) (2000).
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) (2000).
47. See 1996-1997 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, TRAINING & EMPLOYMENT REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR 30-31; see also Department of Labor, Permanent Labor Certification,
available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/foreign/perm.asp#form.html (last visited Aug. 24,
2003).
48. See 1996-1997 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, TRAINING & EMPLOYMENT REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR

31-32.

49. Id. at 32.
50. See Department of Labor, PermanentLabor Certification,at http://www.ows.doleta
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who apply and submit a recruitment report to the SWA. 5' The SWA will
then forward the report to the DOL regional offices that conduct the final
52
reviews. If any qualified U.S. workers are identified, the application will
be denied.53
In response to criticism that the supervised recruitment is too time
consuming and costly, the DOL developed the streamlined process of
Reduction in Recruitment (RIR).54 With the RIR method, an employer may
receive labor certification by showing that within the past six months it has
engaged in a pattern of recruitment in an effort to hire U.S. workers for the
position, but has been unsuccessful in identifying qualified and available
U.S. workers.55 If the certifying officer concludes that the pattern of
recruitment is appropriate, the application will be approved with no need
56
for the SWA to do a supervised recruitment process.
The processing time for labor certification varies from state to state.
The regular processing method may take up to two years or more to
complete."7 The DOL estimates that using the RIR method could reduce
the processing time to less than one year. 58
II. DIAGNOSIS OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY SYSTEM AND POLICY
ARGUMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT

An effective and equitable regulatory framework for employment of
foreign skilled workers should be able to achieve two major objectives.
First, it should generate a competitive workforce for the economic growth
of the country while protecting domestic labor markets from unfair
competition with efficient administrative channels available to implement
such ends. Second, the individual rights of foreign workers should be
sufficiently protected against undue coercion.
Two major branches of law are assigned the task of achieving such
objectives. Immigration law is designed mainly with regard to the U.S.
employer and domestic labor market; the rights of foreign workers are
.gov/foreign/perm.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Department of Labor, GeneralAdministrative Letter No. 1-97 (Oct. 1, 1996), at
http://www.ows.doleta.gov/dmstree/ga/gal97/gal_01-97.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003)
(indicating the measures in place by the Department of Labor to increase efficiency in the
Permanent Labor Certification Process).
55. See Basic Labor Certification Process, 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(i) (2000).
56. Id.
57. Department of Labor, Foreign Labor Certification Processing Times and Dates,
availableat http://www.ows.doleta.gov/foreign/times.asp (last visited on Oct. 27, 2003).
58. Department of Labor, Permanent Labor Certification,at http://www.ows.doleta.gov
/foreign/perm.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
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rarely addressed. But foreign skilled workers should be able to resort to the
general principles of labor and employment law in order to protect their
individual rights in U.S. workplaces. Although the current system is
generally up to the challenge, certain problems arise where the rights of
immigrant workers are needlessly compromised yet fail to enhance an
effective and efficient immigration system.
A.

Analysis of Existing Problems

1.

Regulatory Requirements in Conflict with Market Reality

One major problem lies in the issue of how to determine whether the
admissions of foreign workers will have adverse effects on the domestic
workforce. In particular, there are always competing arguments for and
against more admissions of H-lBs, which are the driving forces that shape
the current system.5 9 The adopted checking measures, such as the six-year
limits, annual numerical caps, restricted portability of visas, and permanent
labor certification applications, are designed to protect the domestic
workforce. Such measures seem to be based on the premise that the
government is a planner of the marketplace and can accurately predict the
cyclic shifts in supply and demand.
However, this premise is very problematic. The government that
chooses to intervene in the market directly is often unable to respond to the
changing economic conditions.
For instance, Congress dramatically
increased the H-1B quota for fiscal years 1998 to 2003, from 65,000 per
year to 195,000 per year, in response to the "new economy" booming in
late 1990s and to the computer industry's outcry for more information
technology professionals. 6° These measures are obviously becoming
unjustifiable in light of the Internet bust and the economic recession that
emerged in 2000 and 2001. The increased inflow of foreign information
technology workers and the rising unemployment rate nationwide aroused
hostility from domestic workers, 6' and worsened the conditions of H-lBs
who suddenly found themselves unemployed and forced to choose between
59. See B. Lindsay Lowell, Temporary Workers and Evolution of the Specialty H-lB
Visa, in 23 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 33, 33 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 2001) (arguing that "the
proposed increase in the H-iB cap has serious consequences for the individual H-iB
visaholder and the permanent system").
60. See supra note 16.
61. See Carrie Johnson, Anger in Downturn Turns Against Foreign-Born Workers,
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2001, at Li, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentld=A60072-200ISep7&notFound=true (last visited
Oct. 7, 2003) (arguing that the increased number of foreign workers in uncertain economic
times has contributed to the overall anger regarding the H-lB visa system).
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leaving the country or facing severe immigration penalties. 62
In the arena of permanent admission of foreign workers, the labor
certification application also exemplifies the gap between the promises of
government intervention and the market reality.
The supervised
recruitment process becomes a sham in situations where the employer
advertises a job position that has already been filled by a foreign worker
whose performance the employer is so pleased with that it is willing to
sponsor the worker's green card application. Thus, ironically, the job
advertiser is actually avoiding potential job seekers, afraid that an applicant
may answer the advertisement and make the process of getting a green card
petition more troublesome. Facing such a situation, a U.S. worker who
applies for the advertised job may find that, strangely enough, the potential
employer is trying its best to disqualify the applicant. More often, the
advertisement itself is flagged as immigration related, with language such
as "apply to the state workforce agency instead of the employer," so
seasoned job applicants know it would be a waste of time to apply. Thus,
the entire recruiting process mandated by the government becomes largely
wasteful, both for U.S. employers and workers.
The newly initiated RIR process brings the labor certification
application one step closer to the market reality. It requires an employer to
justify the hiring of foreign workers through documenting a pre-filing
pattern of recruitment that locates no qualified U.S. workers. 6 ' This step
more likely mirrors the actual recruiting process, creating no need to
reproduce a sham recruitment. However, potential conflicts still exist. An
employer often decides to sponsor a green card until a couple of years after
hiring the foreign worker. Since the RIR process requires a showing of the
recruiting pattern only during the six-month period immediately before
filing for the labor certification application, an overburdened duplicate of
recruitments is still unavoidable in testing the labor market in most
employment-based immigration cases.

62. See Agustina Guerrero, For Some High-Tech Workers, Layoffs Mean a Ticket
Home, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/cgibin/printpage/printpage.pl (last visited Aug. 25, 2003) (discussing the consequences for HI B workers remaining in the country after the date of their termination from the temporary
employment); see also Jon Swartz, Tech-visa Workers Feel Heat, USA TODAY, Oct. 17,
2001, at 1B, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/money/covers/200 1-10-17-bcovwed.htm
(last visited Oct. 7, 2003) (discussing the defects in the H-IB visa program and the resulting
negative effects on both domestic and foreign workers).
63. See Department of Labor, supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Basic
Labor Certification Process, 20 C.F.R. § 656.2 1(i) (2000).
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Tension Between Temporary and Permanent Admission
Programs

Another problem arises from the inherent tension between temporary
and permanent admissions of foreign skilled workers. A lack of clarity on
the admission policies governing the two categories largely contributes to
this problem. The H-1B program aims to meet the temporary demand for
labor in a specific sector of the economy and within a specific period of
time. In the last decade, this program was shaped largely by competing
lobbying efforts and political concerns. Employment-based immigration,
on the other hand, more sensibly focuses on building human capital for the
future, based on the nation's long-term and strategic needs. The current
system does not distinguish between the two programs.
The employment-based immigration program basically duplicates the
64
H-lB program, but makes it more complicated and costly to administer.
The permanent labor certification process emphasizes the current labor
shortage of a specific occupation in the intended area of employment,
without adopting a forward-looking perspective. Moreover, tension exists
because most temporary workers seek permanent admission through the
path of the H-lB program. Therefore, the increased H-lB cap will
generate more than 710,000 foreign workers. 65 However, the permanent
admission system is estimated to absorb no more than 25,000 H-lBs each
year. 66 It could be harmful for both business and foreign skilled workers to
lose those workers who have been fully integrated to the economic
production system during the H-1B period, but are unable to stay
permanently when their visas expire.
3.

Foreign Workers' Rights Compromised

All of the above-discussed drawbacks interplay to generate troubling
issues with regard to the workplace rights of foreign skilled workers. The
rights of legally admitted workers are rarely addressed in contrast to the
rights of undocumented aliens. As to the latter, the Supreme Court held in
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB that the definition of "employee" under the
National Labor Relations Act included undocumented workers who were
discriminated against by unscrupulous employers. 67 The Court made clear

64. See Department of Labor, Permanent Labor Certification,at http://www.ows
.doleta.gov/foreign/perm.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
65. B. Lindsay Lowell, H-1B Temporary Workers: Estimating the Population 14
(2000), available at http://www.ieeeusa.org/forumissues/h Ibvisa/h Ibreport.pdf (last visited
Oct. 27, 2003).
66. Id. at 17.

67. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
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that these workers were entitled to the same statutory protection as all
workers. 68 The same reasoning should apply to legally admitted foreign
workers as well. Intuitively, the problem may appear to be less serious
with regard to foreigners who have work authorization in the country
because legal aliens are generally perceived to have more rights than illegal
aliens. However, the problem resulting from the policy frictions in a
broader sense does exist and often takes a more subtly disguised form.
Under the current system, the immigration measures adopted for
protecting the domestic workforce hamper foreign workers' individual
rights that are guaranteed by the principles of labor and employment law.
"The premise [of such laws] is that individual workers lack the bargaining
power in the labor market necessary to protect their own interests. 69
Therefore, the law "would come to their aid as the weaker party and shield
them from the over-reaching economic strength of the employer., 70 In this
sense, labor and employment laws can be viewed as tools to protect two
basic mechanisms for dealing with problems in the workplace: 1) the
market mechanism of exit-and-entry, in which individual workers respond
to a dissatisfying working condition by quitting and switching jobs; and 2)
the political mechanism of voice, in which dissatisfactions are articulated
through democratic processes in the workplace.
H-1B workers, however, are substantially precluded from making use
of either exit-and-entry or voice mechanisms due to a number of reasons.
First, the portability of employment benefits coming with the temporary
visas is heavily restricted. H-I B workers cannot easily change jobs without
going through sometimes complex administrative procedures.
Second, H-1B workers are afraid of losing their jobs. If they lose their
jobs, H-1B workers are forced to leave the country or risk exposure to the
severe penalties inflicted by immigration law.
If employment is
terminated, foreign workers' H-1B visas technically expire.71 If they
overstay, they are then subject to deportation and civil detention. 72 If they
overstay longer than one year, they can be barred from reentering the
United States for ten years.73 Although the INS rarely enforces these
provisions, the possibility of such consequences still functions to
effectively weaken H-1B workers' bargaining power. Thus, foreign
workers are more vulnerable to potential exploitative employment
68. Id. at 892.
69. Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard,67
NEB. L. REv. 7 (1988).
70. Id.
71.

See AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS § 2:45

(2001) (explaining that ambiguity exists as to how long an H-lB worker is allowed to stay
in the United States searching for a new job after being laid off).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2000).
73. Id.
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conditions, and in turn, domestic workers are more likely subjected to
unfair competition.74
Third, although permanently admitted foreign workers are entitled to
full package rights, H-I B workers' attempts to obtain permanent residency
can be extremely difficult. As discussed above, a majority of the current
H-I B workforce will not obtain their green cards within the six-year limit
of their temporary stay due to the huge administrative backlogs developed
at the DOL and the INS.75 In order to start their green card applications as
early as possible, temporary foreign workers are pressured not to voice
their other concerns to employers.
B.

Arguments for Improvement

Various proposals have been made to improve the regulatory
framework of the employment of foreign skilled workers. Keeping in mind
the main problems of the current system, I will evaluate such proposals and
identify a set of solutions aiming to achieve the two-fold objectives of an
ideal system. Essentially, one goal is to create a flexible, market friendly
temporary and permanent admissions mechanism without sacrificing the
interests of domestic workers. The other goal is to empower foreign skilled
workers in their economic bargaining with employers.
1.

Reformation of Alien Selection Process for Permanent
Admission Purposes

A radical long-term solution calls for fundamentally reforming the
permanent admission system. The current labor certification process
focuses solely on the immediate needs of the labor market. However,
immigrants are permanent additions to the workforce. Thus, a well thought
out plan is much more desirable. An ideal system should seek to admit
those individuals who have a proper reservoir of skills and attributes that
increase the probability of future success.
Some scholars propose to apply a point system for admitting
employment-based immigrants, which has been adopted in part in Canada
and Australia.76 The proposed system would not concentrate on matching a
74. See Viji Sundaram, A Tech Worker's Tale of H-lB Exploitation,
http://www.isn.org/news/20010530203453.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (reporting on
the hardships endured by an Indian H-I B worker in the Silicon Valley).
75. B. Lindsay Lowell, H-1B Temporary Workers: Estimating the Population 15
(2000), available at http://www.ieeeusa.orglforum/issues/l bvisa/h Ibreport.pdf (last visited
Oct. 27, 2003) (estimating that less than 40% of the H-lBs admitted in 2002 would adjust to
permanent status within their duration of stay and the rate reaches just more than 50% by the
end of the decade).
76. DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, BALANCING INTERESTS:
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particular alien to a particular employer, but would value certain human
capital attributes such as language proficiency, age, skill, educational level,
net worth, job experience, existing job offers, and the like.77 An alien
would have to receive a specified number of points to be eligible for
permanent admission.78 Such a system could be easily adjusted to
changing economic and labor market conditions through the imposition of
realistic requirements or demanding characteristics. Therefore, the point
system would protect U.S. workers more sufficiently.79
Still other scholars have advocated for a more liberal immigration
policy in admitting foreign skilled workers by following the principles of
free trade. In line with the arguments for free trade, they suggest that the
United States could utilize the resources it spends on monitoring
immigration in a much more effective fashion by investing in making U.S.
workers more competitive rather than in erecting barriers. 80 As an
alternative to the current immigration system, Professor Chang
recommends substituting a head tax or optimal immigration tariff as
preferable methods of selecting immigrants.8
Perhaps a more practical approach is to rely on incremental
improvements that can be achieved within the current system. The labor
certification process easily becomes the most visible target. The lengthy
and costly procedure is hardly justifiable if we evaluate its impact against
the big picture. Given that the Immigration Act restricts the available
employment-based immigrant visas to an annual quota of 140,000, among
which the allocation of only 110,000 (the total of second and third
preferences) is subject to labor certification, the impact of this process in an
economy of hundreds of millions of jobs is almost negligible. Also, the
DOL approves a significant majority of the submitted applications. 812 This
(Carnegie Endowment for
Int'l Peace 1996).
77. Id. at 152-53.
78. Id. at 139.
79. Id. at 138-39.
80. See generally Howard F. Chang, LiberalizedImmigration as Free Trade: Economic
Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1149 (1997) (noting
that the "free movement of workers across borders promotes economic welfare by
promoting free trade in the labor market"); see also Jonathan Todres, Lessons from the
Trade Arena: A Proposalto Change U.S. Immigration Law for the Benefit of U.S. Workers,
1 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 49, 50 (2000) ("[I]n light of increasing globalization, the United
States needs to review its approach to immigration .... ").
81. See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains
From the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 380
(1998) (suggesting that unskilled immigrants would pay a high tariff while skilled
immigrants would pay a lower tariff, and arguing that the private sector would benefit from
elimination of all restrictions on immigration of labor).
82. During our interview, Ms. Jenny Yan estimated that about 70% of the filed labor
certification applications are approved. See Interview with Ms. Jenny Yan, supra note 41;
RETHINKING U.S. SELECTION OF SKILLED IMMIGRANTS 134-35

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

194

[Vol. 6:1

casts further doubt on the necessity of retaining a complex labor
certification procedure.
Even though the elimination of the entire process is politically
unlikely, a reformed system with more realistic approaches and streamlined
procedures would be very helpful. For instance, the simplified RIR process
should become the norm instead of the exception. In addition, blanket
waivers or pre-certifications should be established for highly qualified
petitioners, thereby eliminating enormous administrative hurdles for a huge
portion of applicants. Workers in such pre-certified categories may include
those holding advanced degrees from universities in the United States and
those who have been working for a considerable period of time and have
been fully absorbed into the U.S. workforce. 3 There can be no question
that working within the country gives rise to a presumption of belonging.
In the words of Professor Gerald Lopez:
It is not possible ... to have persons live, work, and participate in
a community over many years without creating in them a sense of
entitlement to some benefits of community membership and a
No
moral obligation based on their reasonable expectations.
matter how strongly our formal laws deny it, our conduct creates
the obligation.84
For these workers who have experienced a period of "earning" the
right to permanent residency, the labor certification process becomes
extremely unnecessary and redundant.
2.

Restructure of Government's Role in Temporary Admission
Program

Several revisions are also necessary for a successful temporary
First of all, a temporary system must remain
admissions program.
"temporary" in its real sense as a response to the ongoing labor shortage. A
market friendly mechanism should rely on authoritative labor market
signals to objectively determine the scope of the temporary workforce

PAPADEMETRIOU & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 76, at 102-06 (explaining that past approval
rates have been very high).
83. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Characteristics of Specialty
Occupation Workers (H-IB): Fiscal Year 2002 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.bcis.gov/graphics/shared/services/employefinfo/FY2002charact.pdf (estimating
that 30% of the H-lB workers earned a master's degree, 17% earned a professional degree
or doctorate degree, and 34% of initial petitions were filed by aliens in the U.S., which
normally indicates that such aliens either studied or worked in the U.S. before they applied
for H-IB status).
84. Gerald P. Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just
615, 696 (1981).
REv.
UCLA L.
Immigration Law and Policy, 28
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needed. This type of mechanism would adjust to changing market
conditions, thus relieving Congress from highly unreliable speculations on
setting up fixed quotas. Also, instead of intervening in a normally
functioning market, the government should take an active role in correcting
market malfunctions. In the temporary worker context, the government
should aim at preventing employers from hiring foreign workers as cheap
labor to replace qualified U.S. workers. In addition, the government should
ensure that legally admitted foreign workers are employed under legal
conditions.
One critical step to achieve this goal is to go after the violators and
investigate the complaints filed by both U.S. and foreign workers.
However, the current system fails to meet either objective. On the one
hand, it subjects hiring decisions of employers to extensive INS
examination. On the other hand, its bureaucratic practice often makes the
government examination toothless, and implementation weaknesses leave
the system vulnerable to abuse."
The INS scrutinizes each foreign
worker's qualifications and the employer's job requirements, and secondguesses the employer's hiring decision on the merits. These practices are at
odds with the fundamental principles of a capitalist market economy,
allocating limited governmental resources to tasks that would be more
efficiently accomplished through self-enforcing market mechanisms. Such
misplacement results in leaving the government with insufficient resources
to detect and prosecute the abusive uses of the temporary employment
program.8 6 The protection for domestic and foreign workers is illusionary
if abuses go unpunished. A more sensible approach would call for
absolving government from numbers speculation or merit-based reviewing.
Commentator Sarah Jain has suggested adopting a non-capped pilot
project in which admissions of temporary workers are not subject to
arbitrary quotas, but the project period is extendable upon periodic reviews
of worker shortage by both government and industry in a seamless
process.87 Once foreign workers are hired, domestic workers should be
85. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H-1B FOREIGN WORKERS: BETTER CONTROLS
TO HELP EMPLOYERS AND PROTECT WORKERS 19-28 (Sept. 2000), at
http://shusterman.com/cgi-bin/ex-link.pl?www.gao.gov/new.items/he00157.pdf (last visited
Oct. 7, 2003) (discussing several factors that contribute to the problem, such as limited
enforcement authority and inadequate INS adjudication procedures).
86. According to a 1996 Labor Inspector General report, 75% of H-IB workers "were
working for employers who did not adequately document the proper wage on the [Labor
Condition Application] and, when the actual wage could be determined, 19[%] of H-lB
workers were paid less than the wage specified on the LCA." Id. at 22-23. Assuming this
percentage remains constant, violations of the prevailing wage requirements of the H-I B
program that go unpunished could be very substantial. In 1999, about 137,000 H-IB
workers were approved, yet only 135 complaints were received. Id. at 20.
87. Sarah Jain, Note, Looking to the North While Playing Doctor: Solving the H-1B
NEEDED

Visa Problem by Following Canada's Lead, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 433, 452-54
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encouraged to utilize available dispute resolution procedures to challenge
employers' decisions on hiring foreigners if they deem the substantive
requirements of H-1B laws are not satisfied or are unjustifiably used to
discriminate. The government, in turn, should focus on reviewing the
implementation of the law by employers, and on vigorously initiating
regular audits of their compliance. In this way, the government could
convert its limited resources from examining the merit of each employment
decision by employers to enforcing, investigating, and adjudicating
allegations of temporary program abuse.
3.

Empowering Foreign Workers

Finally, better protection for workplace rights of foreign skilled
workers will serve the interests of domestic workers and reduce
unscrupulous employers' reliance on exploitative employment. Therefore,
an effective application of labor and employment laws to foreign workers
serves the policy of immigration laws as well. It helps to ensure that the
wage and employment conditions of domestic workers are not adversely
affected by the competition of foreign workers who are not subject to the
standard terms of employment. With the advantage of preferring undercompensated foreign workers minimized, U.S. employers' hiring of foreign
workers would more likely naturally result from a diminished domestic
workforce. That is, if the market demand for foreign skilled workers is
generated for the "right" reason, there may be less undermining of
immigration policies and fewer violations of immigration laws.
One important way to empower workers in disadvantaged bargaining
positions is to minimize the burdens that the government unnecessarily
imposes on a worker exercising her individual rights. A foreign skilled
worker is better protected if able to freely negotiate and leave an employer
if she so chooses. Aided by the above discussed improvements on the
immigration system, foreign skilled workers could gain substantial leverage
in negotiating with an employer without fearing too much that the
employer could dominate the employment relationship by controlling the
green card application. Foreign skilled workers should be free from
confusion about available options; they should be able to expect their
permanent resident statuses through the revised permanent admission
system within a reasonable period of time. Otherwise, these workers
should benefit solely under the revised temporary admission program that
can be flexibly adjusted according to the changing labor shortage
conditions.
Moreover, Jain has suggested achieving improved protection for
(2001).
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foreign workers by separating a foreigner's visitor status from the
employment authorization, modeling the Canadian system of admissions.8 8
Under such a system, a foreigner could gain general entry into the country
as a visitor, and if the visitor would like to work and secures employment,
the government then grants work authorization through its temporary
admission program. If foreign workers become unemployed, they would
not automatically lose the legal right to stay and therefore face severe
consequences as the existing system mandates. The visitor's status could
remain valid, allowing the visitor to stay in the country without work
authorization. 89 This method would effectively remove foreign workers'
constant fear of immigration penalties as a result of losing their jobs.
III. CONCLUSION

In summary, this comment examines many of the frustrating aspects
of the current regulatory framework for employing foreign skilled workers.
In addition to being subject to labor and employment laws, the employment
of foreign skilled workers is largely regulated by immigration laws. The
H-1B visa program admits a limited number of foreign workers filling
specialty occupations in the United States for a maximum period of six
years. A majority of H-1B workers, however, seek permanent residency
during their allowed temporary stay through employer-sponsored
immigration petitions. As part of such petitions, a labor certification
application is designed to generate a government-supervised recruitment
process in order to ensure that no qualified U.S. workers are replaced by
the foreign workers.
The existing immigration regulatory scheme
substantially restricts foreign skilled workers' workplace rights in light of
such problems as: arbitrarily imposed numerical caps, limited portability of
employment benefits, a lengthy and costly permanent admission processes,
and the harsh effect on workers' immigration statuses in connection with
job security.
Ironically, these restrictions on foreign skilled workers' rights do not
necessarily work to serve the best interests of domestic businesses and
workforces.
Limited government resources are diluted through
unwarranted interference with private business decision-making and are
diverted from effectively enforcing the law. To better address these
challenges, policymakers need to adopt more flexible and clearly defined
employment immigration policies.
As to the permanent admission
program, the government needs to develop a sensible framework for
determining which immigrants are to be admitted based on the nation's

88. Id. at 456-57.
89. Id.
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strategic needs. As to the temporary admission program, the government
needs to develop more market-oriented procedures to fill labor shortages
and more efficiently enforce measures to deter violations. Only when
unnecessary burdens inflicted by the insensible system are lifted can both
immigrant and domestic workers adequately enjoy their individual rights
and truly reap the benefits provided by immigration and diversity, two
exceptional characteristics of the great American society.

